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  1Summary. — This paper examines the effect of household access to microcredit upon work by seven to 
eleven year old children in rural Malawi. Given that microcredit organizations foster household enterprises 
wherein much child labor is engaged, this paper aims to discover whether access to microcredit might increase 
work by children. It is found that, in the season of peak labor demand, household access to microcredit, 
measured as self-assessed credit limits at microcredit organizations, raises the probability of child work in 
households with average landholdings and retail sales enterprises.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the effect of household access to microcredit upon children’s propensity to 
work in rural Malawi and so conjoins the two topical subjects of microcredit and child labor.  Given 
the growing role of microcredit in development financing and the increased disbursement of official 
aid via microcredit programs, an assessment of the effects of microcredit access upon child labor will 
be a useful contribution to research in the sustainability of development financing. 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) considers child labor to be ‘simply the single 
most important source of child exploitation and child abuse in the world today’ (ILO, 1998 A). As 
Binder and Scrogin (1999) put it, there are at least four reasons for the objectionability of child labor.  
First, child labor reduces children’s current welfare. This is an especially pressing reason given 
children’s vulnerability to exploitation. Second, by plausibly reducing children’s schooling, child labor 
may also lower children’s future welfare 1. Third, reductions in children’s schooling may slow the 
pace of national economic growth. Fourth, as argued by Basu and Van (1998), child labor may, by 
competing with adult labor, reduce adult wages, thereby increasing household dependence upon 
children’s earnings, making for a vicious cycle of continued child labor. 
The International Labor Organization estimates there were about 211 million 5 –14 year old 
economically active children worldwide in 2000, of whom 186.3 million were child laborers, and 120 
million worked full-time (ILO, 2002).  An economically active child, by the ILO, is one who works at 
least 1 hour a week.  All 5 – 11 year old economically active children are considered child laborers. 
On the other hand, an economically active 12-14 year old is considered a child laborer only if she 
performs at least 14 hours of non-hazardous work per week, or at least 1 hour of hazardous work per 
week. The ILO considers work to be activity producing a marketable output. This includes work for 
pay as well unpaid work in a household farm or non-farm enterprise but excludes children’s domestic 
chores, performed mainly by girls, such as the fetching of firewood and water, cooking, cleaning, and 
childcare. In light of this, the ILO may be considered underestimating the magnitude of child work. 
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economic activity, has the highest incidence of child work in the developing world (ILO, 1998 B). 
Children’s labor force participation rates are highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (ILO, 1998 B).  As 
regards Malawi in Southern Africa, the ILO estimates that 35.2 per cent of 10 to 14 year old 
Malawian children were working in 1995 (ILO, 1996 A).  A Malawi demographic and health study 
(DHS) found that 27 per cent of 5 to 14 year old children (42 per cent of 10 to 14 year olds) were 
working in 2000 (Malawi National Statistical Office, 2001).  By 2004, the proportion of working 5 to 
14 year old children had risen to 37 per cent (Malawi National Statistical Office, 2006).  Even though 
Malawian law prohibits the employment of persons less than 14 years of age, significant child labor 
may be found on tobacco and tea farms, subsistence farms, and in domestic service.  
In any case, labor laws may not be depended upon to stamp out child work, consisting in the 
main of unpaid toil in household enterprises (ILO, 1996 B) usually beyond the ambit of legislation. It 
is now believed this type of work is not innocuous. For example, while the ILO acknowledges the 
need for distinction between “normal family obligations and work which gives rise to exploitation 
and abuse”, it warns that “an emphasis on traditional practices over the potential hazards of work for 
children can result in ignoring the extent of the child labor problem” and that “what happens within 
the family context” may well fall within the purview of labor laws in the future (ILO, 1998 B).  
Similarly, Nieuwenhuys (1994) writes,  “the assumption that children’s work, in the context of the 
peasant family, is morally neutral is preposterous.”  Detailed anthropological study in Kerala, India, 
leads Nieuwenhuys (1994) to conclude that work within the household is not any the less demanding 
or less important for families than market work, and there can be no presumption that poor parents 
are able to protect their children from excessive drudgery and exploitation.  The predominance of 
unpaid household work among children’s economic activities, apprehension that it too may be 
detrimental to children, and the difficulties of bringing household production within the purview of 
labor laws, have led to consideration of alternate means of combating child labor.  For instance, the 
ILO holds that ‘the single most effective way to stem the flow of school-age children into abusive 
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(ILO, 1998 A).  Another such measure gaining currency is improvement in poor households’ access 
to credit. 
While there has been considerable theoretical research upon the relation between access to 
credit and child labor, by, for example, Ranjan (1999) and Baland and Robinson (2000), empirical 
research has been rarer.  This study aims to contribute to the slim body of empirical evidence of a 
relation between access to credit and child labour in developing countries.  Further, whereas 
theoretical models commonly predict a negative relation between credit and child labor, this study 
follows Wydick (1999) in arguing that credit, especially microcredit, may in fact increase child work in 
household enterprises.  After all, credit would enable the use of more capital equipment and other 
inputs in household enterprises and so raise the productivity of family child labor therein.  In other 
words, as shall be elaborated in section II, credit may increase the demand for family child labor in 
household enterprises.  Indeed, empirical analyses of data from rural Malawi reveal that household 
access to microcredit raises children’s propensity to work during the season of peak labor demand.  
However, it is found that access to microcredit is significantly related merely to children’s household 
domestic work. This suggests only adults are busied in credit-stimulated household enterprises 
whereas children merely replace them in the shouldering of domestic chores.  In order to discover 
whether credit-stimulated work by children is detrimental to them, this study also examines the 
relation between household access to microcredit and children’s school attendance.  Even though no 
statistically significant relation between the two is uncovered, the study cautions it may not be 
concluded that children are unscathed. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical 
foundations of a relation between access to credit and child labor, emphasizes it is possible that 
common theoretical predictions are reversed once it is realized that household work is the 
predominant form of child work , and reviews the empirical literature.  Section III describes the data 
from rural Malawi and discusses empirical issues in the measurement of access to credit.  Section IV 
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microcredit, and the empirical findings.  Section V summarizes these findings and briefly concludes. 
 
II.  ACCESS TO CREDIT AND CHILD LABOR 
While child labor is widely held to stem from poverty, Ranjan (1999) and Baland and Robinson 
(2000) take the nuanced view that it isn’t poverty per se but rather poverty combined with lack of 
access to credit that causes (excessive) child labor. These authors assume parents are altruistic, 
deriving satisfaction from their children’s future consumption.  Parents may augment their children’s 
future consumption in two ways, namely, by schooling them so as to raise their future earnings, or by 
bequeathing them an inheritance.  The cost to parents of leaving a bequest is, naturally, reduction in 
their own consumable resources.  Similarly, by schooling their children as opposed to working them, 
parents forego children’s earnings from labor. Parents choose an optimal combination of schooling 
and bequest by, for example, trading-off a quantity of bequest for more schooling.  Poverty poses the 
particular difficulty that poor parents may not have resources to bequeath their children and so there 
is no question of trading-off a sum of bequest for more schooling, that is, unless it were possible for 
bequests to take negative values. Therefore, poverty-stricken parents unable to engineer negative 
bequests, that is, resource transfers back in time from adult children to parents, may be constrained 
to educate their children less than they would like.  Since child labor is the converse of children’s 
schooling in this model, poverty may, thus, cause child labor to be greater than in an interior 
solution.  Access to credit may alleviate this difficulty by enabling negative bequests. Were children to 
be relied upon to honor their parents’ debts, parents might simply borrow at present to leave their 
children the negative bequest of debt.  Thus, if it were possible for impoverished parents to borrow, 
work by their children might not be excessive.  
Alternatively, parents whose initial endowment is low relative to their children’s future 
earnings may wish to transfer resources from the future to the present. With option to borrow, 
parents would accomplish this inter-temporal resource transfer by availing of loans upon the strength 
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on their parents’ debts, that is, upon children’s altruistic feelings for their parents or ‘reverse 
altruism’. On the other hand, without access to credit, parents may be compelled to effectuate an 
inter-temporal resource transfer by the means of putting their children to work as opposed to 
schooling them, increasing parents’ current consumption at the expense of children’s future earnings. 
Hence, an increase in household access to credit may decrease child labor.  
However, this ignores household economic and domestic work wherein the bulk of child 
workers is engaged. Wydick (1999) makes the rare observation that improved access to credit may 
increase children’s household economic work.  By making the purchase of market inputs like capital 
equipment possible, credit may raise children’s labor productivity in household enterprises. Given 
that the poor in many developing countries now often obtain credit in the form of microenterprise 
loans, that is, loans for the purposes of production rather than consumption, improved access to 
credit may, thus, increase child work, particularly when hired labor is scarce or when the potential for 
moral hazard by hired labor is high making hired and household labor poor substitutes in household 
enterprises (Wydick, 1999).   
Even though a relation between access to credit and child labor is amply supported in 
theory, it has seldom been empirically verified. Dehejia and Gatti (2005) find evidence of a 
significantly negative cross-country association between child labor and access to credit as measured 
by the ratio of private credit issued by banks to GDP.  Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006) find that 
transitory income shocks in the Kagera region of Tanzania lead to increased work by children but 
that household access to credit, measured by the value of household collateralizable assets, mitigates 
the increase. Wydick (1999), investigating the effect of microenterprise lending upon child labor in 
western Guatemala, finds that increased access to credit generally reduces the likelihood of a child 
being withdrawn from school for the purposes of work in a household enterprise.  However, the 
author discovers that this positive effect of access to credit upon children’s schooling is dampened 
when the nature of the household enterprise raises the potential for moral hazard by hired labor or 
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Ersado (2005) finds that credit access, measured by the presence in the community of a commercial 
bank, is likely to improve school enrollment rates while decreasing child labor in rural Nepal and 
Zimbabwe. Ersado (2005) discovers, however, that proximity to a commercial bank in rural Peru 
actually increases the probability of children working as against attending school.  The author 
conjectures credit in rural Peru fosters household enterprises employing child labor. Hence, that 
credit may increase child work already finds a modicum of empirical support. 
 
III.  THE DATA 
Data for this study are drawn from the Malawi Financial Markets and Food Security Survey 
conducted jointly in 1995 by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the 
Department of Rural Development (DRD) of the Bunda College of Agriculture of the University of 
Malawi.  A total of 404 rural households in 45 villages of 5 Malawian districts were surveyed.  These 
households did not constitute a random sample. Since it was necessary to include sufficient numbers 
of microcredit program participants in the survey, stratified random sampling was employed to 
ensure that half of the final sample of 404 households consisted of current microcredit program 
participants with past participants and non-participants making up approximately equal portions of 
the remainder.  The non-randomness of the sample calls for the inclusion of sampling weights in 
estimation.  
The data are rich in household and community descriptors. Further, discontinuous time 
allocation 2 data for seven to eleven year old children were elicited.  Children were assumed to 
allocate time between educational, leisure, and work activities.  Since child work, by girls in particular, 
would be underestimated if household domestic chores were excluded, it is taken to consist of the 
fetching of firewood/dung/straw, helping in field/with animals, working at somebody else’s for 
wage/meal, the fetching of drinking water, and other domestic housework.  Of these, the fetching of 
firewood/dung/straw, the fetching of drinking water, and other domestic housework may be 
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was unreported: it is merely known if a child undertook the activity.  It is notable, however, that 
Nankhuni’s and Findies’s (2004) analysis of 1997 – 1998 Malawi Integrated Household Survey data 
indicates 6 to 14 year old Malawian children spend an average of as many as 18.3 hours per week in 
household domestic work. The authors find that the most common form of children’s domestic 
work is the provision of childcare to younger household members. This is followed by the fetching 
of water, cooking, and the gathering of firewood. 
The yearlong survey consisted of three rounds.  The first round was conducted from 
February to April, the second between July and September, and the third in November and 
December.  The Malawian farming season begins in November.  February to April is the period of 
peak harvest during which the demand for child labor is particularly high.  Indeed, the proportions of 
children engaging in some type of work in the first, second, and third rounds of the Survey were, 
respectively, 51.7 per cent, 45.3 per cent, and 35.9 per cent.  Data from each round of the Survey 
were analyzed separately. The key variables pertaining to household credit access were found to be 
statistically significant only in the analyses of data from the first round.  This suggests the effect of 
household access to credit upon child work is pronounced only in periods of peak labor demand. 
Consequently, this study only reports the results of the analyses of data from the first round 
(February-April) of the Survey. 
Access to credit, in studies relating it to economic outcomes, has usually been measured in 
two ways: dichotomous membership in credit programs, and actual loan uptake.  Both these 
measures may be unsuitable for estimating the true causal effect of credit access (David and Meyer, 
1980). First, since credit program participation and loan uptake are voluntary, the measures are 
potentially endogenous.  For example, parents who avail of loans may be less likely to have their 
children work, but it cannot be concluded that loans reduce child work since parents more eager to 
educate their children may be likelier to seek out helpful loans.  Second, loan uptake would measure 
access to credit accurately only if credit limits were universally binding, that is, if everyone’s loan 
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option to borrow.  Even so, that option may well influence their economic behavior. For example, 
households with unexercised option to borrow might, as a result, feel sufficiently secure to embark 
upon a household enterprise employing child labor.  Third, membership in a credit program often 
confers benefits unrelated to credit access such as literacy classes and business training. These 
secondary effects of credit program participation may confound the true causal effect of access to 
credit. Finally, mere membership in a credit program may not guarantee ready access to credit. 
Indeed, many group-based credit programs stipulate that only half of a group’s members may receive 
credit at any time. Even credit programs repudiating this rule rarely provide their members with 
assured access to credit.  
Hence, Diagne (1998) and Diagne and Zeller (2001) argue that the credit limit, that is, the 
maximum amount that may be borrowed as self-reported by survey participants, is a better measure 
of credit access. The authors reason that unlike credit program participation or loan uptake, which 
are related to demand for credit, the credit limit, reflecting mainly supply-side factors such as the 
availability of credit programs and the financial resources of lenders, is a truer measure of an 
exogenous credit constraint.  Therefore, the Malawi Financial Markets and Food Security Survey 
having queried respondents over 17 years of age about the maximum amount they might conceivably 
have borrowed, this study measures a household’s access to microcredit by summing the self-
assessed credit limits of its members at microcredit organizations. Given that 75 per cent of the 
households surveyed had adult members who were either current microcredit program participants 
or past participants, that is, who were familiar with microcredit organizations and their lending rules, 
it is likely these self-assessed credit limits are credible.  We don’t discount the possibility, however, of 
exaggerated credit limits since access to microcredit may be a source of pride. It is also acceded that 
this novel measure of access to credit is not indisputably exogenous.  For instance, an individual’s 
credit limit may reflect her credit-worthiness, and an individual willing to have her children 
contribute to the success of her economic enterprise, that is, an individual demonstrably committed 
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suggested that a credit limit, the maximum amount that may be borrowed, being externally imposed, 
is less likely to be endogenous than actual loan uptake or dichotomous credit program participation. 
Some institutional details of microcredit programs in Malawi follow. The nation has four 
main credit and savings programs: the Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), Promotion of 
Micro-Enterprises for Rural Women (PMERW), the Malawi Mudzi Fund (MMF), and the Malawi 
Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO). The first three are group-lending programs, 
whereas MUSCCO is an individual membership based union organization.  MRFC and MUSCCO 
provide seasonal agricultural credit, mainly to tobacco and maize farmers.  PMERW and MMF, 
operating in but a few districts, specialize in off-farm credit, though a portion of MMF’s loan 
portfolio supports agricultural operations. In addition, there are numerous small credit programs run 
by NGOs and foreign government organizations. Interest rates charged by these programs are fairly 
high. For instance, MRFC charged an annual interest rate of 40 per cent in 1994-95 (Diagne and 
Zeller, 2001). This was partly owing to Malawi’s high rates of inflation at the time. 
 
IV.  ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Improvement in access to credit is taken to relax the working capital constraints of household 
production.  Indeed, working capital toward household production may increase even if no 
borrowing occurs.  For example, given uncertainty, a household with greater access to credit may, 
with loans to fall back upon, be likelier to use precautionary savings to purchase inputs. In other 
words, the mere option to borrow may raise a household’s working capital. 
Wydick (1999) suggests two effects of an increase in working capital on a household’s 
employment of its children: the ‘family-labor -substitution effect’ and the ‘household-enterprise-
capitalization effect’.  Additional working capital would permit the replacement of family labor in 
household enterprises by hired labor.  Further, since additional working capital may boost the 
profitability of household enterprises, family labor in such enterprises may also be reduced via an 
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makes for a negative relation between resources allocated to household production and child labor 
employed therein.  However, the effect would be diminished if hired labor were either a poor 
substitute for family labor or in short supply.  For example, Wydick (1999) contends that households 
may find hired labor an inadequate substitute for family labor in retail sales enterprises given 
opportunities for petty theft. The ‘household-enterprise-capitalization effect’, on the other hand, 
pertains to the increase in the marginal productivity of child labor in household enterprises because 
of the increase in purchased inputs that additional working capital enables. This makes for a positive 
relation between working capital and child labor in household enterprises.  Thus, the net effect of 
household access to credit upon child labor depends upon the relative magnitudes of the mutually 
opposed ‘family-labor -substitution effect’ and ‘household-enterprise-capitalization effect’.  
  The above motivates an econometric model of child labor that may be specified simply as  
H* = X’β + u,       ( 1 )  
where H* denotes a child’s optimal work hours, X  indicates a vector of correlates that includes a 
measure of household access to credit and interactions that capture the ‘family-labor-substitution 
effect’ and ‘household-enterprise-capitalization effect’, and u, the error term, represents unobserved 
random influences.  Given that work by children in the Malawi Financial Markets and Food Security 
Survey is measurable only as a dichotomous variable, H* may be considered the latent variable 
underlying a binary H such that H = 1 if H* > 0, H = 0 otherwise. Assuming the error term, u, is 
normally distributed, (1) may be estimated by probit ML.   
  Estimates of the coefficients of the twin equations 
H1* = X’β1 + u1      ( 2 )  
and 
H2* = X’β2 + u2,    (3) 
where H1*  and H2* denote optimal hours in household domestic work and household economic 
work 3, respectively, would reveal whether access to microcredit influences these two types of child 
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and Bedi (2003) find that while children’s extra-household (outside the home) work is positively 
related to schooling costs in rural Pakistan, children’s intra-household work, the dominant form of 
child work, is insensitive to changes in the costs of schooling.  Similarly, Amin, Quayes, and Rives 
(2006) find that children’s market work in Bangladesh often exerts a different effect upon their 
schooling than their domestic work.  Since H1* and H2* are observed but dichotomously, (2) and (3) 
may be jointly estimated by bivariate probit ML, assuming the errors u1 and u2 are bivariate-normally 
distributed. 
 
[Table 1 approximately here] 
 
Table 1 presents the sample means of all utilized variables. Of the 261 seven to eleven year 
old children examined, 51.7 per cent worked in the two days preceding their interview, work, as 
stated, being taken to consist of the fetching of firewood/dung/straw, helping in field/with animals, 
working at somebody else’s for wage/meal, the fetching of drinking water, and other domestic 
housework.  42.9 per cent of children undertook domestic work, taken, as stated, to consist of the 
fetching of firewood/dung/straw, the fetching of drinking water, and other domestic housework.  
11.1 per cent undertook economic work, that is, work other than domestic chores.  No child in the 
sample worked at somebody else’s for pay, that is, engaged in market or extra-household economic 
work, and so work other than domestic chores consists entirely of household economic work.  These 
figures indicate that 2.3 (42.9 + 11.1 – 51.7) per cent of children undertook both household domestic 
and economic work.  By these statistics, 74.7 per cent of the sampled children attended school during 
the past school year.  Average age in the sample is near 9 years. Girls constituted about 48 per cent of 
the sample. Sample mean household access to microcredit stood at 972.9 Malawi Kwacha 4.  
Table 2 presents probit estimates of (1). As discussed, the non-random nature of sampling in 
the Malawi Financial Markets and Food Security Survey necessitates the inclusion of sampling 
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household since it is likely that such clustering vitiates the independence of error terms across 
children.  It appears girls are significantly more likely to work than boys in rural Malawi. The 
probability of child work declines significantly in household size.  It is plausible that household size 
measures the combined availability of family labor, and is, therefore, negatively related to the 
probability of an individual child being called upon to work. The probability of work increases 
significantly in the number of younger children.  This is not surprising given that children must often 
assist in the rearing of younger siblings, and that the quanta of domestic chores even other than 
childcare increases in the number of young children. Controlling for measures of household wage 
labor income and wealth, children appear significantly less likely to work in female-headed 
households.  This is consistent with the increasingly popular view that intra-household resource 
allocation results from bargaining between parents, and that, given the nature of maternal solicitude, 
there is a positive relation between female empowerment and children’s well-being (for example, 
Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995, and Pitt and Khandker, 1998).  The probability of child work declines 
significantly in household wage labor income, in household landholding, and in the number of retail 
sales enterprises. These are plausibly in the nature of wealth effects.   
 
[Table 2 approximately here] 
 
Three village attributes, namely, the presence of a primary and a secondary school, and the 
proportion of village households with relatively large landholdings, are included as regressors.  The 
former two variables seek to measure local access to schooling.  Note that secondary schools in 
Malawi are of three types: conventional government schools, Distance Education Centers (DECs), 
now called Community Day Secondary Schools (CDSSs), and private schools. Conventional 
government schools in 1995 were all highly subsidized boarding schools, selection into which was 
determined by a national entrance examination. Thus, the presence in a village of a secondary school 
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school 5.  In that event, the variable would instead capture aspects of local economic development 
such as the quality of communications links.  The third village attribute included as a regressor, the 
proportion of village households with relatively large landholdings, attempts to measure the local 
availability of labor for hire, since the supply of labor to market plausibly decreases in household 
landholding. Hence, it is expected that the greater the proportion of village households with relatively 
large landholdings, the smaller the local supply of labor for hire, with consequences for the 
employment of family child labor in household production. However, none of these variables is a 
significant correlate of children’s propensity to work.   
The share of acreage under major crops devoted to tobacco is included as a regressor given 
that tobacco cultivation is highly labor intensive and that it is widely believed children are particularly 
adept at plucking tobacco leaf. The variable, however, is found to be statistically insignificant. 
The interaction ‘Household access to microcredit × Area owned land in acres’ endeavors to 
identify the ‘household-enterprise-capitalization effect’, that is, rise in child work in household 
enterprises following increases in children’s labor productivity therein brought about by credit-
enabled increases in the enterprises’ working capital.  Farming is the primary occupation of 66 per 
cent of household heads in the Malawi Financial Markets and Food Security Survey (Diagne and 
Zeller, 2001), which suggests farming is the commonest household enterprise in rural Malawi.  It is 
plausible that the increase in labor productivity upon family farms from a credit-enabled increase in 
purchased inputs would be more pronounced the greater the input of land.  Hence, the interaction of 
household access to microcredit and household landholding is expected to be positively correlated 
with children’s propensity to work 6. In sum, by the ‘household-enterprise-capitalization effect’, 
microcredit raises children’s labor productivity in household enterprises and so increases child work.  
When the household enterprise is the family farm, it is reasonable that this rise in children’s labor 
productivity and, hence, work, would be more pronounced the larger the farm.  It is plausible, 
  16therefore, that child work increases in the explanatory variable ‘Household access to microcredit × 
Area owned land in acres’. 
The interaction ‘Household access to microcredit × Number of retail sales enterprises’ may, 
similarly, relate to the ‘household-enterprise-capitalization effect’, though it may also bear upon the 
‘family-labor-substitution effect’. While working capital facilitates the substitution of hired for family 
labor in household enterprises, substitution would be held back if hired and family labor were 
imperfect substitutes as, for example, in retail sales enterprises given their susceptibility to pilferage 
by employees.  Substitution would also be obstructed by a shortage of labor for hire, as perhaps in 
villages in which a high proportion of households own relatively large tracts of land. Hence, the 
interaction ‘Household access to microcredit × Proportion of village households owning +5 acres of 
land’ is also taken to pertain to the ‘family-labor-substitution effect’.  Since the negative ‘family-labor-
substitution effect’ of household credit access upon child work would be dampened by imperfect 
substitution between hired and family labor and by  a shortage of labor for hire, these two 
interactions are expected to be non-negatively correlated with children’s propensity to work.  In sum, 
whereas credit would ordinarily enable the substitution of hired for family labor in household 
enterprises, that is, reduce child work , this substitution may be hampered if the enterprises were best 
run by trusted household members or if labor for hire were in short supply. Therefore, whereas 
microcredit may exert a negative effect upon child work by the ‘family-labor-substitution effect’, it is 
plausible the regressors ‘Household access to microcredit × Number of retail sales enterprises’ and 
‘Household access to microcredit × Proportion of village households owning +5 acres of land’ shall 
exert opposite, that is, non-negative, effects. 
By the probit estimates in table 2, access to microcredit significantly reduces the probability 
of child work in households without owned land or retail sales enterprises. However, when 
combined with the sample means in table 1, the estimates indicate that a 100 MK (about $6.7) 
increase in access to microcredit raises the probability of child work in households with sample mean 
values of ‘area owned land in acres’ and ‘number of retail sales enterprises’, in that -0.079 + 
  170.015×5.520 + 0.043×0.371 = 0.02 > 0.  This translates to a rise in the probability of child work, 
calculated at the sample mean values of the regressors, of 0.7 percentage points 7, a notable finding 
given that 100 per cent and 31 per cent of the sampled children resided in, respectively, households 
owning land and operating retail sales enterprises.  The positive coefficients of the interactions 
‘Household access to microcredit × Area owned land in acres’ and ‘Household access to microcredit 
× Number of retail sales enterprises’ together with the statistical significance of these variables are 
interpretable as evidence of the ‘household-enterprise-capitalization effect’. That the coefficient of 
the interaction ‘Household access to microcredit × Number of retail sales enterprises’ is non-negative 
perhaps also points to imperfect substitution between hired and family labor that obstructs the 
‘family-labor-substitution effect’.  Since hired labor may not replace family labor when it is in short 
supply, it is not surprising that the interaction ‘Household access to microcredit × Proportion of 
village households owning +5 acres of land’ is non-negatively related to the probability of child work.  
The finding that child work may increase in household access to credit is broadly consistent with 
Wydick’s (1999) discovery that the negative effect of credit upon child work may be dampened by 
the ‘household-enterprise-capitalization effect’ and an obstructed ‘family-labor-substitution effect’. 
 
[Table 3 approximately here] 
 
Table 3 presents estimates of (1) re-specified to elucidate some gender dimensions of the 
effects of household access to credit upon child work.  It is found that while household access to 
microcredit reduces the probability of work by boys in households without land or retail sales 
enterprises, it does not have a statistically discernible effect on the probability of work by such  girls.  
The ‘household-enterprise-capitalization effect’ as measured by the coefficient of the interactions 
‘Household access to microcredit × Area owned land in acres’ appears significantly smaller for girls 
than for boys.  The interaction ‘Household access to microcredit ×Number of retail sales enterprises’ 
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effect on girls’ propensity to work.  
Table 4 presents bivariate probit estimates of (2) and (3). Girls are significantly more likely 
than boys to be put to domestic work. The probability of child domestic work decreases in 
household size and increases in the number of younger siblings. Children appear less likely to 
perform domestic chores in households headed by women. Further, the older the household head, 
the lower the probability of child domestic work. The probability of child domestic work decreases 
significantly in household wage labor income, in household landholding, and in the value of 
household assets other than land, livestock, and food stocks. On the other hand, girls are significantly 
less likely than boys to undertake household economic work. The probability of child household 
economic work decreases in the value of household landholding. It increases in the share of acreage 
under major crops devoted to tobacco, as well as in the number of household retail sales enterprises.  
The probability of such work increases in the proportion of village households with relatively large 
landholdings. This stands to reason if the availability of labor for hire is negatively related to the 
proportion of village households with relatively large landholdings. Lastly, children in villages with a 
primary school and a secondary school are significantly less likely to engage in household economic 
work.  
 
[Table 4 approximately here] 
 
It is notable that household access to microcredit significantly raises the probability of child 
domestic work in households either owning land or operating retail sales enterprises.  That, on the 
other hand, access to microcredit or its interactions aren’t statistically significant correlates of 
children’s economic work suggests children must relieve adults of domestic chores as the latter are 
busied in credit-stimulated household enterprises. 
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gender dimensions of the effect of household access to microcredit upon the probabilities of child 
household domestic work and child work in a household enterprise. It appears access to microcredit 
raises both boys’ and girls’ propensities to engage in domestic work in households owning land.  
Access to credit raises the probability of domestic work by boys in households operating a retail sales 
enterprise.  Credit access reduces the probability of household domestic work by boys in villages in 
which a large proportion of households owns 5 or more acres of land, that is, in villages with possibly 
insufficient labor for hire.  Perhaps boys are instead deployed in household enterprise, but this is 
belied by the finding that access to microcredit and its interactions have no statistically discernible 
effect upon boys’ household economic work.  Credit access appears to reduce the probability of girls 
in households without owned land or retail sales enterprises engaging in such work. Finally, access to 
microcredit also seems to raise the probability of girls’ household economic work in villages with 
perhaps insufficient labor for hire.  
 
[Table 5 approximately here] 
 
Might the conjecture that child work in households either owning land or operating retail 
sales enterprises is affected by microcredit only to the extent that children must relieve adults of 
domestic chores as the latter are busied in credit-stimulated household enterprises, be directly tested? 
This is attempted as follows.  First, the examined seven to eleven year old children are matched to 
their households’ members over 17 years of age. This yields a sample of 410 adults.  Their 
involvement in farm or non-farm enterprises is then related to household access to microcredit via a 
regression equation similar to (1).  The ensuing probit estimates are presented in table 6.  By the 
estimated coefficients of the key variables, the rise in probability of adult participation in economic 
work from a 100 MK (about $6.7) increase in household access to microcredit, calculated at the 
sample mean values of the regressors, is 0.7 percentage points. It is notable that, by the estimates in 
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0.7 percentage points as well.  Hence, it appears adults are indeed drawn into household economic 
work following improved access to microcredit, and that children are consequently called upon to 
take on more household domestic work.   
 
[Table 6 approximately here] 
 
While it is learnt that children’s participation in work and their households’ access to 
microcredit are positively related in rural Malawi in the season of peak harvest, it is as yet unclear 
whether the rise in children’s work from their households’ greater access to microcredit is detrimental 
to them.  Hence, this study finally examines the effect of microcredit upon a critical dimension of 
children’s future well-being, namely, their current school attendance. School attendance, like work, is 
reported but dichotomously in the Malawi Financial Markets and Food Security Survey, and so a 
child’s optimal hours in school, S*, must be treated as a latent variable underlying it’s binary 
counterpart, taken to be an indicator of whether she attended school in the past school year.  Hence, 
assuming that ν, the error term, is normally distributed, the equation 
S* = X’γ+ ν,       ( 4 )  
where the regressors X are the same as in (1) – (3), is estimated by probit ML.  Table 7 presents the 
resulting estimates.  Briefly, household access to microcredit and its interactions are found to be 
statistically insignificant correlates of children’s propensity to attend to school. This suggests trade-
off between children’s work and schooling is marginal, since, in contrast, by the estimates in table 2, 
household access to microcredit and two of its three interactions are statistically significant correlates 
of children’s propensity to work.  Perhaps, as argued by Ravallion and Wodon (2000), trade-off 
between children’s work and schooling is greatly tempered by children’s leisure absorbing the effect 
of the one upon the other, that is, by more work leading to less leisure rather than to less schooling.  
Unfortunately, this may not be directly verified since the available time allocation data are 
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Furthermore, dichotomous school attendance is an imperfect measure of children’s human capital 
accumulation at school.  Even though household access to microcredit doesn’t reduce children’s 
school attendance, it is plausible their increased work, leading to fatigue as well as less time for study 
outside of school hours, reduces their learning at school.  In sum, even though microcredit appears 
to increase child work without reducing their school attendance, it may not be concluded that 
children are unscathed.  Future empirical analyses of better suited data may supply more conclusive 
evidence in this regard.  
 




This study seeks to estimate the causal effect of household access to microcredit, measured in a novel 
manner as self-assessed credit limits at microcredit organizations, upon children’s propensity to work 
in rural Malawi.  This measure of access to credit, it has been argued, is a truer, more exogenous, 
measure than actual loan uptake or dichotomous credit program participation. Whereas both 
consumption and microenterprise loans bring about consumable resource transfers from the future 
to the present and so reduce parents’ incentives to effectuate such transfers via putting their children 
to work, consumption loans achieve this directly whereas microenterprise loans realize this but 
indirectly, by promoting family enterprises.  Given that such enterprises routinely employ household 
members, including children, this study aims to discover whether access to microcredit might 
increase rather than decrease child work.  
It is found that, in the season of peak labor demand, children’s propensity to work in rural 
Malawi, computed at sample mean values of household land ownership and number of retail sales 
enterprises, increases in household access to microcredit.  It is suggested this is due to children 
  22having to take up more domestic work as adults are busied in household economic work following 
improved access to microcredit.  Further, microcredit-stimulated work by children does not appear 
to reduce their school attendance, suggesting more child work leads to less leisure rather than to less 
schooling.  As argued, this does not imply microcredit has no adverse effects upon children. After all, 
less leisure, and work-induced fatigue together with less time for study outside of school hours, both 
of which would impede learning at school, may be considered adverse effects upon children of 
microcredit-stimulated work.   
This study hopes to bring this possibility of detrimental effects of microcredit upon children 
to the notice of policy makers.  Such effects might be minimized if microcredit organizations 
instituted lending rules sensitive to children’s well-being, such as loans conditional upon household 
children attending school while contributing no labor to the funded enterprises. While 
microenterprise loans are deservedly acknowledged to have improved the lives of large numbers of 
the world’s poor, this paper’s findings indicate that they may cause children to be drawn into 
deleterious credit-stimulated work. 
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TABLE 1 
UNWEIGHTED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
SAMPLE OF 7 – 11 YEAR OLD RURAL MALAWIAN CHILDREN 
Variable Mean  S.D. 
Dependent Variables    
Worked in 2 days preceding interview  0.517  0.501 
Undertook household domestic work in 2 days preceding interview  0.429  0.496 
Undertook household economic work in 2 days preceding interview 0.111  0.315 
Attended school in past school year  0.747  0.435 
Child Attributes    
Female 0.479  0.501 
Age in years  8.816  1.453 
Household Attributes    
Number of members  6.824  2.309 
Number of 0-6 year-old members  1.307  1.142 
Number of 7-11 year-old members  1.783  0.857 
Household head’s age in years  45.393  11.753 
Female household head   0.285  0.452 
Total wage labor income of +17 year-old members, in hundreds of Malawi 
Kwacha (MK), since October 1994 
1.726 6.688 
Area owned land in acres  5.520  7.730 
Value, in thousands of MK, of owned land  5.852  25.270 
Value, in thousands of MK, of assets other than land, livestock, and food stocks  4.181  12.163 
Share of acreage under major crops devoted to tobacco  0.049  0.141 
Number of retail sales enterprises  0.371  0.614 
Village Attributes    
Proportion of village households owning +5 acres of land  0.061  0.084 
Primary school present 0.461  0.499 
Secondary school present  0.049  0.216 
Key Variables    
Household access to microcredit in hundreds of MK  9.729  20.055 
Household access to microcredit ×Male  4.236  9.921 
Household access to microcredit ×Female  5.551  18.940 
Household access to microcredit × Area owned land in acres  99.603  661.460 
Household access to microcredit × Area owned land × Male  29.973  152.147 
Household access to microcredit × Area owned land × Female  71.565  654.673 
Household access to microcredit × Number of retail sales enterprises 5.336  19.528 
Household access to microcredit × Number of retail sales enterprises × Male  2.767  16.326 
Household access to microcredit × Number of retail sales enterprises × Female  2.538  11.513 
Household access to microcredit × Proportion of village households owning +5 
acres of land 
0.998 5.035 
Household access to microcredit × Proportion of village households owning +5 
acres of land × Male 
0.405 2.120 
Household access to microcredit × Proportion of village households owning +5 
acres of land × Female 
0.614 4.682 
n =   261 
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ACCESS TO CREDIT AND CHILD WORK (ALL) 
PROBIT ESTIMATES 
Variable Coefficient  T-ratio  Marginal  Effect 
Constant 1.489  1.49   
Child Attributes      
Female 0.928***  3.65  0.323 
Age in years  0.242  1.63  0.089 
Household Attributes      
Number of members  -0.479***  -3.37  -0.177 
Number of 0-6 year-old members  0.563***  2.74  0.209 
Number of 7-11 year-old members  0.248  0.99  0.092 
Household head’s age in years -0.015  -1.18  -0.006 
Female household head   -0.952***  -2.67  -0.344 
Total wage labor income of +17 year-old members, in hundreds of Malawi 
Kwacha (MK), since October 1994 
-0.033*** -2.86 -0.012 
Area owned land in acres -0.118***  -2.63  -0.044 
Value, in thousands of MK, of owned land  -0.066  -1.41  -0.024 
Value, in thousands of MK, of assets other than land, livestock, and food 
stocks 
-0.021 -0.61  -0.008 
Share of acreage under major crops devoted to tobacco  1.924  1.61  0.713 
Number of retail sales enterprises -0.572**  -2.54  -0.212 
Village Attributes      
Proportion of village households owning +5 acres of land  -3.655 -1.21  -1.353 
Primary school present 0.220  0.83  0.081 
Secondary school present  -0.175  -0.36  -0.066 
Key Variables      
Household access to microcredit in hundreds of MK  -0.079***  -2.59  -0.029 
Household access to microcredit × Area owned land in acres 0.015***  3.70  0.006 
Household access to microcredit × Number of retail sales enterprises 0.043***  2.88  0.016 
Household access to microcredit × Proportion of village households owning 
+5 acres of land 
0.308 1.25  0.114 
      
n =  261 
Log-likelihood  -127.879 
Wald chi-sq(20)  61.40 
Note: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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TABLE 3 
ACCESS TO CREDIT AND CHILD WORK (ALL): A GENDER PERSPECTIVE  
PROBIT ESTIMATES 
Variable Coefficient  T-ratio  Marginal  Effect 
Constant 1.754*  1.77   
Child Attributes      
Female 0.886***  2.92  0.316 
Age in years  0.256*  1.67  0.097 
Household Attributes      
Number of members  -0.482***  -3.20  -0.182 
Number of 0-6 year-old members  0.588***  2.69  0.222 
Number of 7-11 year-old members  0.249  0.97  0.094 
Household head’s age in years -0.019  -1.42  -0.007 
Female household head   -1.120***  -2.86  -0.406 
Total wage labor income of +17 year-old members, in hundreds of Malawi Kwacha 
(MK), since October 1994 
-0.037*** -3.08 -0.014 
Area owned land in acres -0.127***  -2.76  -0.048 
Value, in thousands of MK, of owned land  -0.089*  -1.89  -0.034 
Value, in thousands of MK, of assets other than land, livestock, and food stocks  -0.051  -0.96  -0.019 
Share of acreage under major crops devoted to tobacco  2.136*  1.82  0.806 
Number of retail sales enterprises -0.454*  -1.85  -0.171 
Village Attributes      
Proportion of village households owning +5 acres of land  -3.874 -1.18  -1.462 
Primary school present 0.227  0.81  0.086 
Secondary school present  -0.213  -0.41  -0.083 
Key Variables      
Household access to microcredit in hundreds of MK× Male  -0.154*** -2.76 -0.058 
Household access to microcredit × Female  -0.033  -0.82  -0.013 
Household access to microcredit × Area owned land in acres× Male 0.022***  4.21  0.008 
Household access to microcredit × Area owned land × Female 0.011***  2.76  0.004 
Household access to microcredit × Number of retail sales enterprises× Male  0.080***  3.64  0.030 
Household access to microcredit × Number of retail sales enterprises × Female -0.049 -1.39  -0.018 
Household access to microcredit × Proportion of village households owning +5 
acres of land× Male 
0.238 0.78  0.090 
Household access to microcredit × Proportion of village households owning +5 
acres of land × Female 
0.400 1.28  0.151 
      
n =  261 
Log-likelihood  -123.030 
Wald chi-sq(24)  65.22 
Note: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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TABLE 4 
ACCESS TO CREDIT AND CHILDREN’S HOUSEHOLD DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC WORK 
BIVARIATE PROBIT ESTIMATES 
Variable Coefficient  T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio 
  Household Domestic Work  Household Economic Work
Constant 0.989  0.92  -0.564  -0.40 
Child Attributes       
Female 1.158***  4.26 -0.716*  -1.91 
Age in years  0.249  1.63  0.012  0.08 
Household Attributes       
Number of members  -0.312***  -2.77  -0.177  -1.18 
Number of 0-6 year-old members 0.418**  2.25 0.165  0.79 
Number of 7-11 year-old members 0.232 1.03  -0.261  -0.79 
Household head’s age in years -0.037***  -3.20  0.017  1.08 
Female household head  -1.115***  -3.46  0.387  1.21 
Total wage labor income of +17 year-old 
members, in hundreds of Malawi Kwacha 
(MK), since October 1994 
-0.035** -2.24  -0.009 -0.88 
Area owned land in acres -0.091**  -2.10  0.004  0.09 
Value, in thousands of MK, of owned land  -0.006  -0.012 -0.182*  1.88 
Value, in thousands of MK, of assets other 
than land, livestock, and food stocks 
-0.094* -1.67  0.027 1.26 
Share of acreage under major crops 
devoted to tobacco 
1.419 1.37  1.665*  1.66 
Number of retail sales enterprises -0.665  -2.47  0.657**  2.04 
Village Attributes       
Proportion of village households owning 
+5 acres of land 
-1.915 -0.71  4.273*  1.80 
Primary school present  0.395 1.59  -0.619**  -2.08 
Secondary school present  -0.003 -0.005 -5.779***  -12.91 
Key Variables       
Household access to microcredit in 
hundreds of MK 
-0.036 -1.10  -0.017  -0.56 
Household access to microcredit × Area 
owned land in acres 
0.007** 2.41  0.0002  0.06 
Household access to microcredit × 
Number of retail sales enterprises 
0.044** 2.38  -0.020  -0.57 
Household access to microcredit × 
Proportion of village households owning 
+5 acres of land 
-0.207 -1.14  0.058  0.39 
        
n =   261 
Rho  -0.673 (s.e. = 0.125) 
Log-likelihood -149.442 
Wald chi-sq(40)  1760.72 
Note: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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ACCESS TO CREDIT AND CHILDREN’S HOUSEHOLD DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC WORK:  
A GENDER PERSPECTIVE 
BIVARIATE PROBIT ESTIMATES 
Variable Coefficient  T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio 
  Household Domestic Work  Household Economic Work 
Constant 1.136  1.07  -0.187  -0.15 
Child Attributes        
Female 1.191***  3.58 -0.647  -1.48 
Age in years  0.268*  1.70  0.057  0.38 
Household Attributes        
Number of members  -0.313***  -2.60  -0.204  -1.34 
Number of 0-6 year-old members 0.440**  2.24  0.182  0.86 
Number of 7-11 year-old members 0.254  1.08 -0.260  -0.79 
Household head’s age in years -0.040***  -3.37  0.017  1.08 
Female household head  -1.252***  -3.50  0.136  0.40 
Total wage labor income of +17 year-old 
members, in hundreds of Malawi Kwacha 
(MK), since October 1994 
-0.039** -2.32  -0.012 -1.06 
Area owned land in acres  -0.103** -2.20  -0.049 -0.84 
Value, in thousands of MK, of owned land  -0.036  -0.76 -0.225**  -2.00 
Value, in thousands of MK, of assets other 
than land, livestock, and food stocks 
-0.136** -2.14  0.040 1.06 
Share of acreage under major crops devoted 
to tobacco 
1.881 1.54  2.409**  2.01 
Number of retail sales enterprises -0.527*  -1.79  0.599**  2.04 
Village Attributes        
Proportion of village households owning +5 
acres of land 
-2.130 -0.73  0.870  0.30 
Primary school present  0.422 1.62  -0.891***  2.57 
Secondary school present  -0.071 -0.12  -5.788***  -11.79 
Key Variables        
Household access to microcredit in hundreds 
of MK× Male 
-0.071 -1.50  -0.099  -1.28 
Household access to microcredit × Female -0.018  -0.54  -0.100*  -1.91 
Household access to microcredit × Area 
owned land in acres× Male 
0.012*** 2.69  0.011  1.54 
Household access to microcredit × Area 
owned land × Female 
0.010** 2.28  -0.008  -1.61 
Household access to microcredit × Number 
of retail sales enterprises× Male 
0.074*** 3.02  -0.013 -0.25 
Household access to microcredit × Number 
of retail sales enterprises × Female 
-0.047 -1.43  -0.009  -0.18 
Household access to microcredit × 
Proportion of village households owning +5 
acres of land× Male 
-0.435* -1.72  0.362  1.36 
Household access to microcredit × 
Proportion of village households owning +5 
acres of land × Female 
0.031 0.14  0.718**  1.96 
        
n =   261 
Rho  -0.722 (s.e. = 0.113) 
Log-likelihood -142.62 
Wald chi-sq(48)  2617.70 
Note: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
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TABLE 6 
ACCESS TO CREDIT AND ADULT HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC WORK 
PROBIT ESTIMATES 
Variable Coefficient  T-ratio  Marginal  Effect 
Constant -0.830  -1.00   
Adult Attributes      
Female -0.276  -1.06  -0.109 
Age in years  0.053***  3.54  0.021 
Household Attributes      
Number of members  0.118  0.88  0.047 
Number of 0-6 year-old members  0.029  0.16  0.011 
Number of 7-11 year-old members  -0.144  -0.58  -0.057 
Household head’s age in years -0.027  -1.37  -0.011 
Female household head   0.151  0.47  0.060 
Total wage labor income of +17 year-old members, in hundreds of Malawi 
Kwacha (MK), since October 1994 
-0.056* -1.90  -0.022 
Area owned land in acres  -0.029  -0.68  -0.011 
Value, in thousands of MK, of owned land  -0.033  -1.13  -0.013 
Value, in thousands of MK, of assets other than land, livestock, and food 
stocks 
-0.013 -0.49  -0.005 
Share of acreage under major crops devoted to tobacco  1.868**  1.97  0.744 
Number of retail sales enterprises 0.857***  2.82  0.341 
Village Attributes      
Proportion of village households owning +5 acres of land 3.90*  1.81  1.552 
Primary school present  -0.548** -2.02  -0.216 
Secondary school present  -0.168  -0.23  -0.067 
Key Variables      
Household access to microcredit in hundreds of MK  0.051**  2.29  0.020 
Household access to microcredit × Area owned land in acres 0.002  0.91 0.001 
Household access to microcredit × Number of retail sales enterprises -0.074***  -2.68  -0.029 
Household access to microcredit × Proportion of village households owning 
+5 acres of land 
-0.274** -2.50  -0.109 
      
n =   410 
Log-likelihood  -207.087 
Wald chi-sq (20)  69.70 
Note: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
  29TABLE 7 
DETERMINANTS OF CHILDREN’S SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
Dependent Variable = Attended school in the past school year; Probit Estimates 
Variable Coefficient  T-ratio 
Constant -3.203***  -2.87 
Child Attributes    
Female -0.309  -1.15 
Age in years  0.261***  3.18 
Household Attributes    
No. of members  -0.165  -1.10 
No. of 0-6 year-old members  0.221  0.99 
No. of 7-11 year-old members  0.509*  1.81 
Household head’s age in years  0.029*  1.77 
Female household head   -0.102  -0.28 
Total wage labour income of +17 year-old members, in hundreds of Malawi 
Kwacha (MK), since October 1994 
-0.027* -1.81 
Area owned land in acres  -0.022  -0.50 
Value, in thousands of MK, of owned land  0.067  1.32 
Value, in thousands of MK, of assets other than land, livestock, and food stocks  -0.017  -0.61 
Share of acreage under major crops devoted to tobacco  -0.022  -0.02 
No. of retail sales enterprises  -0.650  -1.64 
Village Attributes    
Proportion of village households owning +5 acres of land  3.350  1.32 
Primary school present  0.350  0.93 
Secondary school present  1.488**  2.40 
Key Variables    
Household access to microcredit in hundreds of MK  0.001  0.04 
Household access to microcredit x Area owned land in acres  0.003  1.07 
Household access to microcredit x No. of retail sales enterprises 0.048  1.21 
Household access to microcredit x Proportion of village households owning +5 
acres of land 
-0.170 -1.19 
    
n =   261 
Log-likelihood -127.162 
Wald chi-sq(20)  115.34 
Note: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 The empirical evidence with regard to the effect of child work upon schooling is, however, 
ambiguous. For example, Psacharopoulos (1997) uses data from Bolivia and Venezuela to show that 
children who work are more likely to fail at school and that child work reduces educational 
attainment by almost two years.  In contrast, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) find that child 
labour is not detrimental to schooling in Peru.   
2 It is merely known if certain activities were undertaken at certain times of the day. 
3 No child in the study undertook market economic work. 
4 The exchange rate was US $1 for MK 15 in 1995. 
5 The study’s sample of 261 children is drawn from 36 villages of which only one has a secondary 
school. This uncommonness of secondary schools suggests the Survey elicited information only of 
conventional government schools.  
6 Wydick (1999), on the other hand, attempts to capture the ‘household-enterprise-capitalization 
effect’ rather directly by including, as a determinant of work by children, an indicator of whether 
borrowed monies were used to purchase capital equipment. However, given enterprises make labor 
and capital input decisions simultaneously, it is likely the indicator variable is endogenous. 
7 Ø(X’β) × (-0.079 + 0.015×5.520 + 0.043×0.371), where Ø(X’β) is the standard normal density 
calculated at the product of the matrix of the sample mean values of all regressors and the matrix of 
the estimated probit coefficients. 
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